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INTRODUCTION
An innovative software technology known as Bitcoin 1 has been in the
news recently, though mostly for the wrong reasons. The financial press, as
it typically does, aims to fuel speculative predictions on future market
prices, and Bitcoin has captured the press’s attention largely because of an
extremely rapid growth in the price of the scarce units of account that the
Bitcoin technology creates. Worth essentially nothing four years ago,
bitcoins recently have helped individuals make and lose fortunes.2
This Essay is not concerned with the price of a bitcoin; indeed, though
I have followed the technical details of the software from its early days, I
have no useful personal price speculation to offer, and I doubt anyone else
does either. In fact, it is surprising how readily experts continue to try to
predict the financial future.3
Instead, this Essay introduces to the legal community a fascinating,
decreasingly farfetched technological possibility that the Bitcoin software
promotes, and it offers suggestions for how the law might interact with that
possibility. In short, Bitcoin allows autonomously operating software—
such as a computer virus or the software that manages a network of
vending machines—to exercise control over significant wealth, not as an
intermediary for individuals or companies, but rather, in a functionally
meaningful sense, in its own right.

1
See Bitcoin, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014) (“Bitcoin uses peer-topeer technology to operate with no central authority or banks; managing transactions and the issuing of
bitcoins is carried out collectively by the network.”).
2
See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, Investors, and Swindlers, See Big Profits in Bitcoin, INT’L N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2013, at 14.
3
See, e.g., Eric Posner, Fool’s Gold: Bitcoin is a Ponzi Scheme—The Internet’s Favorite Currency
Will Collapse, SLATE (Apr. 11, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
view_from_chicago/2013/04/bitcoin_is_a_ponzi_scheme_the_internet_currency_will_collapse.html
(“Unless a bitcoin has value as a currency, it has no value at all, and its price in dollars will fall to
zero. . . . Bitcoin will collapse when people realize that it can’t survive as a currency because of its
built-in deflationary features, or because of the emergence of [an alternative], or both.”). For
perspective, I continue to find Grant Gilmore’s skepticism of strong conclusions from the social
sciences helpful: “[N]o historian, social scientist or legal theorist has ever succeeded in predicting
anything.” GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 99 (1977).

1486

108:1485 (2014)

Of Bitcoins and the Zero-Member LLC

Part I of this Essay briefly describes the Bitcoin software technology
for a legal audience. Part II explains how Bitcoin promotes the possibility
of independently wealthy software. Part III considers several legal
approaches to regulating autonomous software that acts as a business
enterprise. The legal analysis is exploratory, and it is only a first step; it is
too early to offer definite normative opinions. But it will likely be
important for legal “technologies,” such as organizational forms; concepts
of legal entities and legal personality; and institutional systems of contract
and tort law, to keep pace with technological innovation. 4
I. BITCOIN: THE IMPORTANT DETAILS
The Bitcoin software is an attempt to provide for the distributed
management, by computer software, of artificially scarce resources known
as bitcoins. If the system works, as it has so far been shown to do, it
permits people to send these scarce digital resources at low cost to one
another over the public Internet without relying on a trusted intermediary.
The resources themselves have negligible “intrinsic” value, much like
conventional modern national currencies and even (putting aside minor
industrial uses) gold. But market forces have, for some time now, treated
them as valuable. For our purposes, the precise value that the market
assigns to the scarce resources controlled by Bitcoin is not important; all
that is important is that “a bitcoin”—an arbitrary, divisible unit of the
scarce resources created by the software—has some value.
So long as (1) the system continues to work as expected, and (2)
market participants continue to assign a positive value to a bitcoin, anyone
with an Internet-connected computer can, because of the Bitcoin software,
send something of financial value to others, anywhere in the world, without
relying on an intermediary institution. This is true even if that person has
no wealth outside the Bitcoin system, no access to local bank accounts or
other financial organizations and, for many practical purposes, no
permission from local regulatory authorities. The ability to transfer
financial value in this way, in short, is the software’s significant
technological innovation.
4

Bitcoin raises other problems for legal regulation that need to be addressed in their own right.
There are a variety of important but comparatively mundane questions, such as what sort of capital
gains treatment, if any, should attend profits from private trading in bitcoins. More subtle is the
potential tax treatment of profits from “mining,” or creating through software processes the valuable
units of account in cryptographically backed currency. There are also questions about the interaction
between Bitcoin and the securities laws. See, e.g., SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL
4028182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013). And systems like Bitcoin surely will raise both challenges and
possibilities for criminal law enforcement. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of
N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Charges Against Bitcoin Exchangers, Including CEO of
Bitcoin Exchange Company, for Scheme to Sell and Launder over $1 Million in Bitcoins Related to
Silk Road Drug Trafficking (Jan. 27, 2014) (available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases
/January14/SchremFaiellaChargesPR.php).
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Bitcoin was developed between 2007 and 2009 by a programmer
called Satoshi Nakamoto, though there is consensus that that was a
pseudonym. 5 Nakamoto initially informed an established group of
cryptographers of his idea 6 and then released an implementation of it to that
group, 7 eventually setting up a forum for discussing and promoting
Bitcoin. 8 Nakamoto, however, no longer actively communicates or
participates in Bitcoin under that name, and he remains unidentified.
Instead, Bitcoin’s development has proceeded in a typical fashion for an
open-source project, with a variety of volunteer programmers 9 maintaining
the software under informal processes that depend on rough notions of
consensus and that are subject to no fixed legal or organizational
structure. 10 People download and run new versions of the software largely
because they trust its ongoing process of development. As with many opensource, networked software projects, there can be—and are—multiple
versions of the software, written by distinct parties, that can all
interoperate. 11
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer software system, which means, practically
speaking, that the entire system is made up of versions of the software that
end-users download and run on their personal computers. There is no
Bitcoin server or Bitcoin company that directly manages the system.
Indeed, the lack of such centripetal features was a core design goal for
Bitcoin; as Nakamoto once wrote, “At some point I became convinced

5
See Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH. L.J. 159, 162 (2012); Posting of Satoshi Nakamoto to cryptography@metzdowd.com (Nov. 1,
2008), http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg09959.html.
6
See Posting of Satoshi Nakamoto, supra note 5.
7
See Posting of Satoshi Nakamoto to cryptography@metzdowd.com (Jan. 9, 2009), http://
www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg10142.html.
8
See BITCOIN FORUM, https://bitcointalk.org/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
9
The current lead developer of Bitcoin is now apparently compensated by a group calling itself the
Bitcoin Foundation, which accepts donations in bitcoins and claims to pay some of them to the
developer. The legal structure of that organization is unclear to the public. For more information, see
Governance Structure, BITCOIN FOUNDATION, https://bitcoinfoundation.org/about/governance (last
visited Mar. 30, 2014).
10
For a somewhat technical study of the structure of modern open-source software development,
see Christian Bird et al., Latent Social Structure in Open Source Projects, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH
ACM SIGSOFT INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON FOUNDATIONS OF SOFTWARE ENGINEERING (Mary
Jean Harrold & Gail C. Murphy eds., 2008), available at http://macbeth.cs.ucdavis.edu/cathbaz.pdf.
11
Nakamoto, however, was initially opposed to multiple, interoperable implementations of Bitcoin.
See Satoshi Nakamoto, Re: Transactions and Scripts: DUP HASH160 . . . EQUALVERIFY
CHECKSIG, BITCOIN FORUM (June 17, 2010, 6:46 PM), https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic
=195.msg1611#msg1611 (“I don’t believe a second, compatible implementation of Bitcoin will ever be
a good idea. So much of the design depends on all nodes getting exactly identical results in lockstep that
a second implementation would be a menace to the network.”).
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there was a way to do this without any trust required at all and couldn’t
resist to keep thinking about it.” 12
Most of Bitcoin’s features stem from its decision to avoid what
network theorists call a trusted third party—that is, an authority, above
reproach, that can inform others of the canonical state of the system.
Consider how easy it would be, relatively speaking, to design an Internetbased currency if the design permitted a party that everyone trusts to
coordinate its operation: the trusted party would issue the digital money
according to generally accepted criteria, verify its authenticity, manage its
exchange, and so on. Amazon gift cards work in roughly this way; people
can purchase them from Amazon, log in to check their balance, and apply
them toward future orders. Such a system is extremely straightforward to
create. Though its technical design would of course need to be
appropriately secure, it is neither an academic nor a practical challenge to
create it; it is inexpensive and simple. For example, if the U.S. government,
or a consortium of major American banks, wished to make it easier, faster,
or cheaper than it is today to move dollars around the world online, they
could do so without significant technological innovation.
Bitcoin is different. It is unclear precisely what motivated Nakamoto
to design a decentralized financial system. 13 Perhaps it was an academic
challenge. Partly, however, Nakamoto seems to have intended to make it
robust against certain kinds of organized disruptions: “Governments are
good at cutting off the heads of a centrally controlled network[] like
Napster, but pure [peer-to-peer] networks like Gnutella and Tor seem to be
holding their own.” 14 Whatever the case, unlike a centrally managed
payment system like PayPal, there is a meaningful sense in which nobody
is in charge of Bitcoin.

12
Satoshi Nakamoto, Re: Transactions and Scripts: DUP HASH160 . . . EQUALVERIFY
CHECKSIG, BITCOIN FORUM (June 18, 2010, 4:17 PM), https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=195.
msg1617#msg1617.
13
A prevailing opinion in some of the Internet forums in which people commonly discuss Bitcoin
is that Nakamoto was motivated by libertarian political opinions, given Bitcoin’s ability to avoid some
political barriers to trade. Nakamoto’s writings acknowledge the attractiveness of Bitcoin to
libertarians, but they do not specifically support any view of his own politics. See Posting of Satoshi
Nakamoto to cryptography@metzdowd.com (Nov. 14, 2008), http://www.mail-archive.com/
cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg10001.html (“[The bitcoin system is] very attractive to the
libertarian viewpoint if we can explain it properly.”).
14
Posting of Satoshi Nakamoto to cryptography@metzdowd.com (Nov. 7, 2008), http://www.mailarchive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg09971.html. At the time Nakamoto wrote this, Gnutella
was probably the most popular file-sharing network, commonly used to share unlicensed, copyrighted
material. See Eric Bangeman, Study: BitTorrent Sees Big Growth, LimeWire Still #1 P2P App, ARS
TECHNICA, (Apr. 21, 2008, 7:32 PM), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2008/04/study-bittorrensees-big-growth-limewire-still-1-p2p-app/. Tor is a network originally developed by the U.S. Naval
Research Laboratory that permits plausibly deniable anonymity over the public Internet. See Tor:
Overview, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
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It may seem counterintuitive that a decentralized online network could
ever be an appropriate mechanism for storing and updating convergent
financial records. After all, what prevents cheating? The most obvious kind
of cheating might seem to be counterfeiting, but this problem is relatively
easy to solve through modern cryptography. Conventional uses of
cryptography, such as those that encrypt the network connection between a
financial institution and its individual clients, can ensure the authenticity of
a communication. Just as someone without my password could not log into
my credit union account, someone without my private Bitcoin keys could
not spend my bitcoins. 15
A decentralized online financial network raises a more difficult
problem than ensuring authenticity: What prevents a person from trying to
transmit the same digital asset twice to two different people? Suppose I
enter a physical storefront and convince the storeowner that I have $100
worth of online currency and wish to transfer it to him. Without a central
arbiter to confirm that I have committed a transfer of funds to the owner’s
account, merely giving him something like “access to the funds” has a
potentially complicated meaning. What if, at around the same time I give
him the digital key that confers access to my funds, I send an email with
the same key to an organization across the world, telling it that I wish to
spend $100 at its store? Without an authoritative arbiter, how would one
recipient know that he was the legitimate new owner of my funds, and how
would the other know that it was the victim of an attempt to spend the
money twice?
Much of Bitcoin’s complexity addresses this problem. For years, it
was thought that an online financial network would require at least some
central locus of trusted authority in order to prevent duplicate
transactions. 16 Nakamoto’s software, however, showed that such trust was
unnecessary; decentralized software could reliably agree upon a single,
authoritative sequence of records so that each potential recipient of funds
could know that he or she is the only recipient of those funds.
The precise mechanism by which Bitcoin produces this authoritative
sequence is complex, but in short, and loosely speaking, it allows
participants to add new financial records to the authoritative sequence by
demonstrating that they have expended computing power on an otherwise
unimportant, repetitive task. This process, known as Bitcoin mining,
confers the right to add a record to the sequence (and also, not incidentally,
it is rewarded by the creation of new bitcoins, partly as an incentive to
participate in the network and partly as a way to manage the initial
15
See Some Bitcoin Words You Might Hear, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/vocabulary (last visited
Mar. 30, 2014) (“In the case of Bitcoin, cryptography is used to make it impossible for anybody to
spend funds from another user’s wallet or to corrupt the block chain.”).
16
See SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 2 (2008),
available at http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
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distribution of bitcoins). 17 In the event of a dispute among different
candidate sequences of transactions, the one that is eventually backed by
the most computing power wins.
Accordingly, for parts of its operation, Bitcoin trusts the majority of
the computing power of the network on a principle that could roughly, and
a bit imprecisely, be called “one computer-processor operation, one vote.”
Thus, faster computers have more influence than slower ones, specialized
hardware can dwarf the “voting” power of ordinary computers, and so on.
As time goes on and more powerful devices run legitimate copies of the
software, it becomes extremely difficult for any single party to disrupt the
system. As a result, widely distributed parties can agree on a canonical
financial ledger even though no one is “in charge” of it.
In practice, this description of Bitcoin is not quite accurate because
Bitcoin does not operate in as rigorously decentralized a manner as
Nakamoto originally designed it. 18 For example, when people download a
copy of the Bitcoin software that participates in the overall network, they
also commonly download data, produced by the current developers of the
peer-to-peer software, that serves to confirm the version of the history of
the network that the current developers deem to be authoritative. Without
this checkpointing, fraud against the Bitcoin network would be at least
conceptually possible if someone were to amass enough computing power
to dwarf the computing power already expended by participants in the
Bitcoin network over the last several years. This would be a significant
practical challenge given the present and historical size of the Bitcoin
network, but it would perhaps not be impossible for a well-funded attacker
with specialized hardware.
The Bitcoin network has moved away from an entirely decentralized
model for other reasons. The developers of the Bitcoin client have the
ongoing capacity to change the Bitcoin protocol in minor but incompatible
ways, actively managing the community of Bitcoin users to make sure that
the Bitcoin network upgrades in ways they have determined. Bitcoin
arguably has already changed more than Nakamoto expected,19 but the
principles behind its design have remained the same.
In short, the Bitcoin network has operated for some time as a reliable
and fraud-resistant means for transmitting value online without financial
intermediaries. Even more importantly, for the purposes of this Essay, it
17

See id. at 4.
Cf. BEN LAURIE, DECENTRALISED CURRENCIES ARE PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE: BUT LET’S AT
LEAST MAKE THEM EFFICIENT 3 (2011), available at http://www.links.org/files/decentralisedcurrencies.pdf (“If Bitcoin is, indeed, using a known consensus group, then it has, after all, a central
authority (that consensus group), and is not, therefore, a decentralised currency.”).
19
See Nakamoto, supra note 11 (“The nature of Bitcoin is such that once version 0.1 was released,
the core design was set in stone for the rest of its lifetime. Because of that, I wanted to design it to
support every possible transaction type I could think of.”). Already, perhaps depending on what “core
design” means, Bitcoin has been shown to be more flexible than this view suggests.
18
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empowers software to transmit value without interacting with the existing
financial system—and perhaps, as it turns out, without even interacting
with humans.
II. INDEPENDENTLY WEALTHY SOFTWARE
The existence of computer programs that act autonomously,
disconnected from direct human oversight, is no longer confined to fiction.
Indeed, examples abound of software systems that could be described as
autonomous. Most computer viruses that spread themselves over the
Internet, propagating themselves by infecting other computers, qualify. 20
Google’s self-driving cars theoretically qualify, at least in a limited sense.
Much software on and off the Internet can operate for years with minimal
oversight.
There is, of course, already little to prevent a barely overseen software
system from transferring significant amounts of money. Automated trading
in financial markets is now commonplace. When automated trading
functions properly, it accounts for a significant part of the operation of
major financial institutions. 21 When it does not, it causes phenomena that
would have seemed astounding just ten years ago, like the “Flash Crash” of
2010 in which the American stock market briefly lost almost ten percent of
its value. 22 But because such software is ultimately acting rather directly on
behalf of people and legal organizations, we do not think of it as owning its
resources. It operates, for example, on financial accounts that are legally
registered in the name of individuals or companies.
Bitcoin’s decentralized financial system raises an intriguing
possibility. It does not depend directly on the law’s recognition of such
things as bank accounts or the law’s requirements that financial institutions
verify their customers. 23 These features of the system make way for
software that could be programmed to act as if it were conducting business
on its own account. It might, as it were, become independently wealthy.
Almost thirty years ago, Meir Dan-Cohen suggested the possibility of
a self-owning company. 24 Conceiving of the modern corporation as “a

20
This sort of virus is often called, in technical circles, a worm. See Worm, FREE ONLINE
DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, http://foldoc.org/worm (last updated Sept. 17, 1996) (defining “worm” as
“[a] program that propagates itself over a network, reproducing itself as it goes”).
21
See generally Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investors, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 689–91 (2013)
(describing the rise of algorithmic trading in modern finance).
22
See Tom Lauricella & Peter A. McKay, Dow Takes a Harrowing 1010.14-Point Trip, WALL ST.
J. (May 7, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487043707045752277541314
12596.
23
E.g., 12 C.F.R. § 21.1–.21 (2013) (implementing statutory requirements to address money
laundering).
24
See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 46 (1986); see also Katsuhito
Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative
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machine endowed with artificial intelligence,” he imagined a process
whereby a corporation repurchases all its own outstanding shares, thereby
becoming “ownerless.” 25 This can, of course, happen without Bitcoin; DanCohen’s self-owning company did not rely on then-futuristic, decentralized
currencies. And to be sure, the possibility of independently wealthy
autonomous software could be achieved without the complex financial
system provided by Bitcoin. For example, software could illegally use the
identity of an individual to access a bank account. Or, even more simply, a
legal and financial system managed by a trusted third party could choose
not to require that bank accounts bear the title of an individual or legal
entity; software could easily, for example, transact with a bank that
identifies “owners” of accounts merely as those who demonstrate
knowledge of a passcode.
But Bitcoin’s success as a decentralized, software-based financial
instrument has paved the way for autonomous software to have convenient,
legal access to a functionally independent financial life. It practically
enables what in the past was just a theoretical possibility.
Consider an example. Suppose that an independently operating
software program, which we might otherwise have classified as a computer
virus, is designed to do something useful, like perform calculations or store
backup copies of data for customers.26 Without Bitcoin, there is no legal,
convenient way for that software to accept payment from customers unless
it does so on behalf of an individual or legal entity, such as a corporation,
partnership, or trust. Because of Bitcoin, however, this program may send
and receive valuable digital tokens from anyone on the Internet, and so it
can easily act, in functional terms, as an independent business, accepting
payment for its services and paying for the resources it uses (such as
computer processing and storage) in order to provide them. It can make
these choices as functions of its own software, without ongoing input from
humans, and then execute the choices using online digital currencies like
Bitcoin.
Importantly, an independently operating software program could likely
do this—practically, very soon in the future, and indeed as a relatively
minor engineering challenge—without special concessions from the law of
any jurisdiction. So long as the inputs to its production are offered online in
exchange for bitcoins, the program has no need for conventional financial
institutions to pay its operational bills. So long as its customers are willing

Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 599–600 (1999) (briefly describing the intellectual
history of this idea and attributing it to others as well, including Martin Wolff and Alfred Conard).
25
DAN-COHEN, supra note 24, at 49.
26
Cf. Gmaxwell, Re: Bitcoin the Enabler—Truly Autonomous Software Agents Roaming the Net,
BITCOIN FORUM (Dec. 7, 2011, 5:45 AM), https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=53855.
msg642768#msg642768 (explaining concept of information storage platform utilizing Bitcoin as a
payment currency).
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to pay the software with bitcoins, it needn’t use those institutions to
manage its accounts receivable. Because of advances in computernetworking technology, 27 software can even hide its physical location
relatively well, so it might even be difficult to interdict an autonomous
system whose only interaction with the world is to produce and consume
digital services (like storage or information processing) in exchange for
bitcoins.
It may initially seem counterintuitive that anyone would set up such an
independent business, given the opportunity to profit themselves from such
businesses. But the Internet is a big place, and people’s motivations are
diverse. Some might do it simply for the technical challenges; others might
contribute because they would prefer to work with an organization that
aims to provide revenue-neutral pricing rather than to extract a profit.
Depending on the service, manual oversight and the private profit motive
may not be especially important; thus, for example, many local grocery
stores are cooperatives, many hospitals and universities are not-for-profit
entities, and many financial institutions are mutually owned. 28 It isn’t hard
to imagine an open-source developer writing the software needed to “seed”
a self-operating online business or potential customers chipping in with
initial funding because of the marketplace advantages they anticipate that it
will bring them. People have paid more for less on “crowd-funding” sites
like Kickstarter. 29
Intriguingly, once a system that provides online services is possible,
there is little conceptual barrier to a similar system’s providing more
conventional “offline” services beyond the Internet. So, for example,
consider a network of vending machines. Someone needs to install the
vending machines and continuously supply them. But from the perspective
of the software operating the network, those tasks are simply another type
of input to production, like disk space or network bandwidth.30 The
software can pay someone to install or stock a new vending machine, verify
that the task has been completed, and remit payment digitally using
Bitcoin. Nothing prevents such services from interacting with each other
and assuming a significant economic role.
Once an autonomous system begins to have a real-world presence, its
legal regulation becomes potentially weightier. In a still fanciful future, for
example, the autonomous software that operates a fleet of airborne drones
27

See Lin, supra note 21.
Cf. Shawn Bayern, Toward Nonprofit Financial Services, HUFFINGTON POST (May 12, 2009,
12:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shawn-bayern/toward-nonprofit-financia_b_201678.html
(describing advantages of not-for-profit financial services such as Vanguard, TIAA-CREF, and credit
unions).
29
Indeed, Bitcoin can itself enable Kickstarter-like crowd-funding without trusted third parties. See
Mike Hearn, Bitcoin Developer, The Future of Money (Aug. 23, 2013), available at https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=Pu4PAMFPo5Y (at 19:25).
30
Cf. Gmaxwell, supra note 26.
28
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that deliver packages 31 might injure someone when one of its delivery
devices accidentally collides with someone’s car. I address this sort of
problem in the next section.
III. THE LAW OF AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONS
This section explores some of the legal ramifications of the potential
rise of independently operating copies of business software. First, it
considers their interaction with existing legal organizational forms, such as
the limited liability company (LLC); in this area, the law, perhaps
surprisingly, already offers appropriate legal “technologies” to respond to
some of Bitcoin’s possibilities. Second, it considers the role of contract and
tort law in enabling and regulating autonomous systems.
A. Autonomous Legal Entities
The law, of course, has a rich history of recognizing fictional entities
and endowing them with many of the same abilities as those of individuals.
This technique, often taken for granted, has proven to be an extremely
productive simplification of the interaction between organizational law and
other areas of law, such as property law, contract law, and procedural law.
We could imagine a system in which partnerships or LLCs need a
distinctive mechanism to initiate or defend lawsuits, own property, or
become parties to contracts; 32 instead, we integrate organizational entities
into the rest of the legal system by means of a convenient abstraction: we
treat them, for many purposes, as if they were individuals.
This technique can be readily extended to accommodate businesses
managed by autonomous software. Indeed, it has effectively already been
extended in this way, though perhaps unintentionally.
First, however, there is a threshold question: Why would we want the
legal system to accommodate autonomous software? Isn’t there something
unsettling about a soulless entity pursuing its own purposes and answerable
to no one? Isn’t it problematic for a computer program to have human
employees? The simple answer is that financially autonomous software
may prove to be useful. A network of vending machines may not need a
human or organizational owner; it may be able to offer items at lower
prices if it need not produce a profit, and it is at least a possibility that the
dictates of an algorithm will make a service more competitive, at least in
some contexts, than the passions of a business school graduate. Moreover,
the notion of this sort of business is not in fact unfamiliar; we might
conceive an autonomous business simply as a conventional not-for-profit
organization that requires minimal manual oversight.

31
32

Cf. Hearn, supra note 29, at 15:18.
Cf. SHAWN J. BAYERN, CLOSELY HELD ORGANIZATIONS 93–94 (2014).
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If such businesses are to arise, how might they interact with legal
organizational structures? One possibility is that their creators aim to
sidestep the law and avoid concerning themselves with organizational
forms. I leave that problem to the next section, however; for now, consider
how a responsible creator of an autonomous system might interact with
American organizational law.
As background, there has recently been some debate as to whether
modern partnership law, such as the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
(RUPA), permits partnerships that have a single “partner” rather than the
more typical pattern of multiple parties acting together to co-own a
business. 33 The question is primarily one of statutory interpretation. RUPA
defines a partnership as “an association of two or more persons to carry on
as co-owners a business for profit formed under Section 202, predecessor
law, or comparable law of another jurisdiction”34 but then outlines
processes by which a partnership may come to have only one partner.35 The
statute’s definition of a partnership does not resolve the ambiguity;
arguably, it requires only that a partnership have two or more partners at
the moment it is formed. 36 It would be formalistic, or at least require further
reasoning, to suppose that a partnership must terminate because it fails to
meet the definitional criteria that govern its formation.
A more nuanced question lurks beneath the surface, however. If a
partnership might have a single partner operating without co-owners, why
does it need even a single partner? Similarly, and probably more
practically, why would a flexible organization like an LLC need to have at
least one member at all times? Indeed, a zero-member LLC might arise
under relatively mundane circumstances. Consider, for example, an LLC
organized to manage a family’s assets; this is a common device for tax,
liability, and estate planning. 37 Suppose the operating agreement provides
that when one parent dies, the other becomes the sole member, and when
that sole member dies, those children in the family that meet a certain
criterion may elect within thirty days to become managing members of the
LLC. It is easily possible that during those thirty days, the LLC may have
no members—effectively, no current owners. Indeed, the Revised Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA) explicitly provides for that
possibility by including, in a list of events that cause the dissolution of an
33

This debate is played out literally as a dialogue between two of the foremost experts on
partnership law in Robert W. Hillman & Donald J. Weidner, Partners Without Partners: The Legal
Status of Single Person Partnerships, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 449, 453–71 (2012).
34
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997).
35
For example, in a two-person partnership, one partner may dissociate under RUPA Section
601(7)(i), and a dissociation of this type will, by default, trigger RUPA’s rules concerning buyout rather
than dissolution. See id. §§ 601(7), 603, 701, 801(1).
36
See Hillman & Weidner, supra note 33, at 459.
37
See generally Thomas E. Dew, Sharing the Family’s Wealth, 81 MICH. B. J. 50 (2002)
(describing family limited liability companies).
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LLC, “the passage of 90 consecutive days during which the company has
no members.” 38
But this provision, perhaps surprisingly, appears not to be a mandatory
rule imposed by the uniform statute. RULLCA Section 110(c) lists the
statute’s mandatory, nonwaivable provisions. 39 That list explicitly refers to
other criteria that might cause dissolution of an LLC—specifically, to
applications by members for court-ordered dissolution as a result of fraud,
oppression, or general illegality—but does not refer to the ninety-day
window for zero-member LLCs. Perhaps this is an oversight, but following
the present version of RULLCA, which several states have adopted,40 it
appears remarkably straightforward to set up a perpetual LLC that has no
members in its final, planned operational state.
The permission of just a single state would be sufficient to enable
autonomous businesses. An organizer of such a business merely would
need to select the organizational law of a state that permits a perpetual
autonomous LLC. 41 And given the connections between organizational law
and the rest of the legal system—the notion of legal personality—such an
LLC could then enter contracts, hire a lawyer to file lawsuits, own
property, set up a bank account, and so on. The full range of Meir DanCohen’s exercise 42 is then legally possible, and it apparently has become
surprisingly straightforward in both law and software.
Of course, the state of artificial intelligence is probably not yet good
enough for an autonomous software system to know what it should do if it
is sued. But just as autonomous software could hire someone to fill empty
vending machines by placing orders with bitcoins, the software that
operates an autonomous LLC might hire a lawyer in response to a lawsuit
(or in response to a determination that one of its contractual claims is
unfulfilled). The software simply needs some authenticable mechanism to
know it has received an official communication from a court that has
jurisdiction over it. Conceptually, this can be managed using modern
cryptography—technology exists for a governmental authority to sign an
electronic message in a manner that proves its origin to be authentic 43—
although in practice, most official communications are not yet issued in a
way that would make sense to software.

38

REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701(a)(3) (2006).
Id. § 110(c).
40
See Limited Liability Company (Revised), UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.
org/Act.aspx?title=Limited Liability Company %28Revised%29 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014) (tracking
state-by-state adoption of the RULLCA).
41
Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (upholding the “internal affairs doctrine” under
which an entity is regulated by the organizational law of the state in which it is organized).
42
See DAN-COHEN, supra note 24, at 46–49.
43
See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 483–502 (2d ed. 1996) (describing algorithms
for digital signatures using public-key cryptography).
39
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That could easily change, however, and indeed it could be tied to the
regulation of perpetual LLCs. The state government, in offering perpetual
autonomous LLCs, can effectively engage in a quid pro quo with the
software designers: We will allow you to create this structure, with the
legal properties you expect, but the autonomous LLC must pay a fee every
year, must provide a digital mechanism by which legal process can be
served, and must satisfy legal judgments against it to continue operating.
As it turns out, this is extremely close to how states already treat LLCs; the
only difference is that states do not always manage the process online or by
means of modern cryptography. For example, it is typical for statutes to
require LLCs to register a physical mailing address for service of process.44
But the difference between a physical mailing address and email is just a
technical detail.
B. Common Law and Regulatory Challenges
If the designers of an autonomous system wish for it to respond
responsibly, with the aid of legal counsel, to its torts or breaches of
contract, the previous section outlines a surprisingly straightforward
mechanism by which that might occur. Just as a conventional LLC might
commit torts or breach its contracts and then be held to legal account, so
might a zero-member LLC.
The situation is more complicated if the designers opt not to use a
zero-member LLC or similarly convenient structure and instead operate
without any specific legal structure. In that event, the appropriate legal
response becomes murkier. It may not be obvious what the law should do
when faced with a software system that has caused, or continues to cause,
legally cognizable damage but has no legally responsible organizer. For
example, how should the law respond to a software system that has no
cognizable owner, legal address, or clear physical presence, yet breaches a
supply contract? Perhaps more ominously, how might the law respond to a
faceless software system (such as a fanciful package-delivery system based
on airborne drones) whose directives have caused physical damage?
A range of responses is possible. For example, the original designer, if
located, could be liable as a matter of simple negligence for setting into
motion an unreasonably dangerous system. Similarly, those who enable the
ongoing operation of a physically dangerous system could be held to have
breached the duty of ordinary care to the system’s victims. Liability of this
kind could extend similarly to breach of contract, because modern law

44
E.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 113(a) (“A limited liability company shall designate
and continuously maintain in this state: (1) an office, which need not be a place of its activity in this
state; and (2) an agent for service of process.”).
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tends to treat a software program as any other tool by which, for example, a
promisor might communicate a contractual offer.45
The individual designer’s liability probably stands even if he or she
chooses to set up an LLC. Too often, people misunderstand the liabilityshielding role of an LLC; although it does shield members from vicarious
liability as members, it does not exempt individuals from liability for their
own torts. 46 As a result, a selfish software developer may have little reason
to go through the trouble of establishing an LLC. Perhaps to encourage the
orderly creation of legal structures, however, LLC acts of the future might
appropriately treat liability incurred by an electronic agent as vicarious
rather than direct, thus providing an incentive for software developers to
use LLCs.
Bitcoin itself is probably too decentralized, and too remote for
purposes of proximate causation, to provide any targets of liability for
enabling an autonomous system. As Part I showed, Bitcoin has no central
authority. Even the individual software developers who maintain the
current, less-than-fully-decentralized version of the Bitcoin software 47
probably have an insufficient connection to harms that separately
developed autonomous agents might cause. Indeed, it is unclear that such
developers would even be a factual cause of the harm for purposes of tort
law just because Bitcoin enabled the harm. (The developers’ marginal
contributions may not themselves have been necessary for the harm to
occur.)
Perhaps most interestingly, however, if a judgment could be enforced
against an unwilling autonomous system—for example, by invading the
system on which it runs and seizing private cryptographic keys—I see no
reason that an informally organized autonomous system should not be sued
in its own right. That possibility seems conceptually strange, but the
procedural rules should aim to achieve functional goals; it would be
unhelpful to ignore useful possibilities on formalistic grounds merely
because they are conceptually strange. Of course, we would not think it
strange to attempt to interdict a dangerous autonomous system as a matter
of public safety. Similarly, common law judges should consider themselves
capable of such interdiction in private law matters as well; their equitable
powers are likely sufficient to issue orders against an autonomous system
that has caused damage.

45
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY LAW § 1.04 cmt. e, illus. 3 (2006) (“At present,
computer programs are instrumentalities of the persons who use them. If a program malfunctions, . . .
the legal consequences for the person who uses it are no different than the consequences stemming from
the malfunction of any other type of instrumentality.”).
46
See BAYERN, supra note 32, at 245.
47
See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
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Whatever the common law response, the combination of Bitcoin and
the zero-member LLC provides at least the possibility of a significantly
new type of economic and legal entity.
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